

























I. WAR AND THE LAW OF WAR 
A. THE LEGAL POSITION OF WAR AND THE OPERATION OF 
THE LAW OF WAR: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The problem of assessing the present state of that body of law serving to 
regulate the conduct of war is, in part, the result of recent changes in the 
international legal system, and particularly in the legal position of war 
itself. According to the generally accepted tradi tiona! theory the act of 
resorting to ·vvar was interpreted, save in exceptional circumstances, as being 
neither legal nor illegal, but simply a fact, situation or event which oc-
curred periodically in the relations among states.1 International law took 
cognizance of this event mainly through the provision of rules, the law of 
war and neutrality, designed to regulate the conduct of states once war did 
occur. 
States actively participating in a war were therefore considered as pos-
sessing equal legal status as far as the war itself was concerned, this equality 
of legal status being the logical result of the purported liberty states had 
under customary international lavv to resort to war. In addition, the 
duties imposed and the rights conferred upon states participating in V\rar 
presupposed a similar equality of legal status in the conduct of war. It 
also followed that the effects of war, territorial or otherwise, as registered 
principally through treaties of peace, created no special problems with re-
spect to their validity. Finally, those states not choosing to participate in 
a war were governed, in their relations with the belligerents, by a special 
1 Not infrequently the resort to war was considered by writers to be "extra-legal," much 
as an event occurring in nature (e. g., an earthquake or flood) can be extra-legal. See A. D. 
McNair, "Collective Security," British Yearhook of International Law (cited throughout as 
B. Y. I. L.), I7 (r936), p. r52.. The act of resorting to war can hardly be considered a natural 
event, however. It is, most thoroughly, a social action, and as such must be regarded as being 
either legal or illegal, as being either permitted or forbidden. Of course, it is not infrequent 
that an act may be permitted in a negative sense; though not specifically authorized by law, it 
is not legally forbidden since the law does not attach a sanction to the commission of the act. 
In the latter instance the act must be regarded as legal, and this would seem to be the correct 
explanation of the "extra-legal'' interpretation of war. Thus Julius Stone states that: "Custom-
ary international law, indeed, does not even regulate the occasions on which extreme private 
force (i. e., war) may be resorted to by States inter se. Resort to war was neither legal nor 
illegal; international law suffered, as it were, a kind of blackout while the choice of peace or 
war was being made." Legal Controls of International Conflict (r954), p. 2.97· Later, however, 
Professor Stone speaks of the "liberty of States to resort to war under customary international 
law" (p. 303). 
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set of rules, whose principal purpose was to insure the strict impartiality of 
the non-participants in their behavior toward the belligerents. 
It is unnecessary for present purposes to discuss or to criticize in any de-
tail this traditional interpretation of war. Despite the fact that its accept-
ance made very doubtful the legal character of this so-called system of law, 
it was by no means an inaccurate reflection of the actual practices of states. 
However, the developments effected principally by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the General Treaty For the Renunciation of War (Kel-
logg-Briand Pact), and the Charter of the United Nations have resulted in 
the general abandonment of this traditional interpretation of war. For all 
three instruments are characterized by the distinction they make between 
a legal and an illegal resort to war. Indeed, the Charter of the United Na-
tions goes tnuch further than did the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
in avoiding altogether the use of the term "war." The Charter attempts 
to ensure-mainly through Article 2, paragraph 42 -that a distinction 
shall henceforth be made between the lawful and the unlawful resort to 
armed force. In principle, then, it is now possible to assert that the place 
of '\var in the international legal order has undergone a fundamental change. 
The resort to war can no longer be regarded as an act which states are at 
liberty to take for whatever reason they may deem proper. 3 
As a result of this general transformation in the legal position of war the 
question has been raised as to whether it is correct to assume the continued 
validity of the law that traditionally has served to regulate the conduct of 
war. Insofar as belligerents are no longer to be regarded as legally equal 
with respect to the act of initiating a war, and the resort to war is no longer 
a matter of indifference to the international legal order, then it would appear 
to some as contrary to principle to continue to assume equality with respect 
to the duties imposed and the rights conferred upon belligerents in the 
actual conduct of war. The suggestion has therefore been made that in a 
war waged unlawfully by one side, and particularly a war that assumes the 
character of a United Nations' enforcement action, the traditional law 
1egulating inter-belligerent relations must be considered as substantially 
modified in its operation.4 
The contention that the rules regulating inter-belligerent relations are 
no longer wholly operative when one side is waging an unlawful war is 
frequently based upon an application of the principle-assumed to be a 
2 Article 2., paragraph 4: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United_Nations." 
a For further reflections on the nature of this change in the legal position of war-particularly 
in relation to the present status of neutrality-see pp. 165-71. 
4 A quite different problem concerns the effects of the changed legal position of war, and 
the obligations incurred by states within a system of collective security, upon the institution · 
of neutrality, especially if this institution is characterized by the principle of strict impartiality. 
See pp. 171-80 for an analysis of these and related problems. 
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principle of positive international law-ex injuria jus non oritur. Illegal 
acts cannot become a source of new legal rights beneficial to the wrongdoer. 
Yet if illegal acts may not serve to establish new legal rights intended by 
or beneficial to the vvrongdoer, how then is it possible for a state, con-
sistently with this principle, to acquire by virtue of its illegal acts those 
rights that have customarily accompanied belligerent status? The view 
that ex injuria jus 1zon oritur is an inescapable princi pie of every legal order 
has led to the conclusion that a state "cannot acquire new powers under 
international law by illegal action; consequently a state which is illegally 
engaged in hostilities acquires no belligerent powers. " 5 
At the same time there has been an understandable reluctance to press 
this argument to its logical conclusion, since it is recognized that a rigid 
reliance upon the principle ex injuria jus non oritur would have undesirable 
consequences. "In relation to the applicability of rules of warfare to the 
belligerent engaging in an unlawful war rigid reliance on that principle 
(i. e., ex injuria jus non oritur) would mean in practice that rules of war 
do not apply at all in a war of this nature. For, unless the aggressor has 
been defeated from the very outset ... it is impossible to visualize the 
conduct of hostilities in which one side would be bound by rules of warfare 
without benefiting from them and the other side would benefit from rules 
of warfare without being bound by them. Accordingly, any application 
to the actual conduct of war of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur would 
transform the contest into a struggle which may be subject to no regulation 
at all. The result would be the abandonment of most rules of warfare, in-
cluding those which are of a humanitarian character." 6 
5 Quincy Wright, .. The Outlawry of War and The Law of War," American ]ottrnal of Inter-
national Law (cited throughout as A.]. I. L.), 47 (1953), pp. 37o-r. Articles,_ and 3 of Harvard 
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression 
(A.]. I. L., 33 (1939), Supp. p. 81-8) read: 
"Article 2. By becoming an aggressor, a state does not acquire rights or relieve itself of 
duties. 
Article 3· (1) Subject to Article 14, an aggressor does not have any of the rights which 
it would have if it were a belligerent. Titles to property are not affected by an aggressor's 
purported exercise of such rights. (1-) An aggressor has the duties which it would have if it 
were a belligerent." 
It should be noted that whereas the preceding draft articles constitute no more than a state-
ment de lege ferenda, Professor Wright offers his opinion as one representative of the existing 
law. And for a quite recent-and influential-view leaning toward the discriminatory char-
acter of the laws of war in an unlawfu~ war, see "La Revision du Droit de laGuerre" (Institut 
de Droit International, Rapport des Trois-Francois, Coudert, Lauterpacht), Annuaire de 
l' Institut de Droit International, 45 (1954), I, p. 555. 
6 H. Lauterpacht, "The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War," B. Y. I. L., 30 (1953), 
p. 1-11-. Nevertheless, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has consistently expressed the conviction that the 
equal application of the law of war in an unlawful war represents a deviation from principle, 
justified largely out of humanitarian considerations. See, for example, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, 
International Law (7th. ed., 1951-), vol. II, pp. '-17-1-1-.-In a recent survey of the problem, 
Professor J. L. Kunz ("The Laws of War," A.]. I. L., 50 (1956), pp. 317-1-1) has pointed out 
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In fact, a strict reliance upon the principle ex tn;uria jus non oritur pre-
sumably would imply that all acts of killing and destruction performed 
by the armed forces of a state that has resorted unlawfully to war vvould be 
equally unlawful and would thereby render the authors of such acts liable 
to appropriate punishment. The well known phrase in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, defining as a crime against 
peace the ''waging of a war of aggression,'' vvould then become literally 
true. 7 
Hence, for humanitarian reasons alone there has been a marked reticence 
to contend that the full consequences of the principle ex injuria jus non 
oritur must be drawn in the case of a state waging an unlawful war. In-
stead, suggestions have been tnade that a distinction be drawn between the 
rules of warfare which bear a humanitarian character, particularly the 
rules relating to the treatment of victims of war, and other rules relating 
to the actual conduct of hostilities, only the former being considered equally 
applicable to all belligerents despite the fact that one side has resorted to 
war in violation of its · international obligations. But whatever the 
specific consequences-and concessions to principle-drawn from the 
application of ex injuria jus non oritur, it is clear that the common premise 
underlying these varying consequences deserves a more careful considera-
tion. For once the "inescapable" quality of this principle is granted its 
application becomes largely a matter of discretion; its limitation will 
depend upon the concessions made by those states waging war against an 
aggressor, concessions made either for humanitarian reasons or for reasons 
of expediency. 
As already noted, the meaning of the principle ex injuria jtts non oritur is 
that a violation of law may not give rise to a new legal situation, to new 
legal rights or duties, intended by or beneficial to the wrongdoer. The 
that the majority of writers remain opposed to the discriminatory application of the law of 
war-even though hostilities have been unlawfully initiated by one side. Yet the basis for 
this continued opposition to any discriminatory application of the law of war rests largely upon 
practical considerations, and particularly those considerations that emerge from the statement 
quoted in the text above. Among many writers, however, the feeling persists that continued 
equal application of the law of war as between an aggressor and his victim is somehow contrary 
to principle; and this uneasiness mounts in the possible case of United Nations enforcement 
action bearing the character of war. Hence, one of the principal purposes of the above com-
ments is to attempt to show that the case for discrimination is open to criticism nOt· only on 
practical grounds but on grounds of principle-or theory-as well. 
7 In their closing addresses before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg both the 
British and French Chief Prosecutors gave expression to this extreme view. The Chief British 
Prosecutor declared: .. The killing of combatants in war is justifiable; both in International and 
in Municipal law, only where the war itself is legal. But where a war is illegal, as a war 
started not only in breach of the Pact of Paris but also without any sort of warning or declara-
tion clearly is, there is nothing to justify the killing, and these murders are not to be distin-
guished from those of any other lawless robber bands." Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (1946), 
Supp. A, pp. 85-6. 
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rule forbidding theft may not, according to this principle, give rise to 
ownership. In international law conquest as a method of acquiring terri-
tory may not be considered as giving rise to a new legal situation, that is 
to rights and duties which would otherwise result from the acquisition of 
territory when undertaken in violation of a rule of international law for-
bidding conquest. 8 
There are, however, serious restrictions to the operation of this principle 
in international law. The contention that the unrestricted operation of 
ex injuria jus non oritur constitutes a logical necessity for the very existence 
of a legal order cannot be maintained. The existence of law does not 
preclude the possible operation of the contrary principle ex injuria jus oritur 
(or, as some prefer, ex factis jus oritur). Illegal acts may give rise to new 
legal rights intended by or beneficial to the wrongdoer. Of course, within 
a highly centralized and consequently a very effective legal system the 
principle ex injuria jus oritur will of necessity have a severely restricted 
operation. The case is quite different in international law. 9 Here, de-
centralization-the absence of centralized judicial, executive and legislative 
organs-and a relatively low degree of effectiveness have led to a corres-
ponding restriction of the principle ex injuria jtts non oritur. 10 A state may 
violate a rule of either customary or conventional international law, and 
yet this violation may give rise to a new legal situation beneficial to the 
wrongdoer. The consequence of an illegal resort to_ war-or to armed 
sIn this connection, it is necessary to observe that ex injuria jus non oritur does not mean, 
though this has been assumed on occasion, that an illegal act ought not to give rise to a new 
legal situation the legislator expressly intended to prevent through a rule of positive law. To 
so maintain would be to impute a tautological meaning to the principle. The legislator whose 
intention is to prevent a certain behavior does so by attaching a sanction to such behavior. 
He may also stipulate, however, that certain further consequences are not to follow from this 
behavior. In international law the resort to force may not only be forbidden under certain 
circumstances, in the sense that force when resorted to under these circumstances is made the 
condition of a sanction, but the law may further provide that the illegal use of force ought not 
to give rise to specific consequences intended by or beneficial to the wrongdoer (e. g., the 
acquisition of territory). The principle ex injuria jus no1Z oritttr has no application in this 
latter instance; it does not forbid what a rule of law already has expressly forbidden. It is 
of possible application only where the legislator has not expressly stipulated that an illegal 
act ought not to give rise to consequences intended by or beneficial to the wrongdoer. 
9 In rejecting the argument on behalf of the discriminatory application of the laws of war 
Professor Kunz (op. cit., p. 318) emphasizes that: .. The present primitive state of international 
law makes any analogy with an advanced municipal law futile. Even a more advanced inter-
national law, as a law binding on great groups of men who dispose of power, will be very 
different from municipal law, which is essentially a law among individuals." 
10 The scope of such restriction will be almost inversely proportional to the effectiveness of a 
legal system. The less effective a legal system, the greater the restrictions. Up to a certain 
ill-defined point this condition may be considered compatible with law. Beyond that point 
all attempts to account for this situation bear the character of a rather strained rationalization 
of the impossible, that is the attempt to equate law with power. It is for this reason, altogether 
understandable, that many writers have been so insistent in their emphasis upon the necessity 
of an unrestricted operation of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur. 
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force-may be the establishment of new legal rights and duties favorable 
to the wrongdoer. It is quite conceivable that this type of situation may 
occur under the Charter of the United Nations. 11 It did occur more than 
once under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its occurrence under 
the Covenant did not imply that that instrument had ceased to be valid 
law. Nor would a similar event mean that the Charter had ceased to be 
valid. What it does mean is that a violation of a general rule of law may 
in time give rise to new law-to new legal rights and duties-if the illegal 
act is successfully consummated. And it will be successfully consummated 
if, and when, it is no longer effectively contested by other interested states. 
To contest effectively the illegal act can only mean to deprive the act of 
some-if not all-of the legal consequences it would otherwise have, had 
it not originated in a violation of law .12 
But even if it is assumed that the principle ex injuria jus non oritur is opera-
tive as against a state waging an unlawful war it does not follaw that the 
aggressor is thereby deprived of the rights t_raditionally accorded to bellig-
erents for the regulation of the conduct of war. To forbid, in principle, the 
resort to war-or the resort to armed force-is to prohibit a specific act. 
The principle ex injuria jus non oritur may then have the effect of preventing 
this illegal act from giving rise to a new legal situation beneficial to the 
11 The prohibition of the use of force under the Charter means, first and foremost, that the 
illegal use of force is made the condition of a sanction, which includes-though not limited to-
the use of force as a lawful reaction. But although the use of force is in principle forbidden 
under the Charter it does not follow from that fact alone t}).at the unlawful use of force may not 
in time give rise to a situation intended by or beneficial to the wrongdoer. The Charter does 
not contain a provision expressly prohibiting this possibility. According to the actual pro-
visions of the Charter the Member states are under no obligation to refuse to "recognize" 
those advantages accruing to a state that has violated (and successfully so) its obligations by 
resorting to the use of force. It has been asserted that "non-recognition" in this instance is 
the only reasonable interpretation of the Charter; that we are obliged to infer that under the 
Charter the unlawful use of force has, in conformity with ex injuria jus non oritur, this effect 
(see, for example, Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 2-o8-ro). But is this, in fact, the only reasonable 
interpretation? Do not the virtually unlimited powers accorded the Security Council under 
the Charter suggest that the Council may decide that the ends of peace and justice-if not 
law-are best served by recognizing the consequences of an illegal action? And if, which is more 
probable, the Security Council is unable to function as intended, there is all the more reason 
for believing that the resort to force-even though unlawful-may give rise to a situation 
beneficial to the wrongdoer. 
12 SeeR. W. Tucker, "The Principle of Effectiveness in International Law," in Law and 
Politics in the World Community (essays in honor of Hans Kelsen, ed. by George A. Lipsky) 
(1953), pp. 31-48. The statements made above therefore assert t~e existence of a rule of 
effectiveness in international law restricting the operation of ex injuria jus non oritur, and that 
it is through the operation of this rule that an illegal act may, in time, give rise to new legal 
rights and duties beneficial to the wrongdoer. Properly conceived, there is no essential con~ 
flier between this assertion of the operation of a rule of effectiveness, as a rule of positive law, 
and the general admission by writers that illegal acts may be ''validated" through prescription, 
the consent of the injured party, or by general recognition. 
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aggressor. More specifically, this may 1nean th.at the aggressor is not en-
titled, though victorious, to legitimize those gains which would otherwise 
follow from his illegal act . The territory he has temporarily obtained 
through conquest, the peace treaty he attempts to impose upon the defeated 
party, and in general those rights he seeks to acquire by virtue of h is victory 
are all prima facie deprived of legal validity. 13 But these considerations are 
quite independent of the assertion, which is here considered as unwarranted, 
that the same principle ex injuria jus non oritur must be interpreted further 
to mean that no legal consequence may result from the illegal act or that no 
legal rights of the wrongdoer may come into operation as a result of the 
act, legal rights specifically provided by law for just this very contingency. 
War-or the resort to armed force-is an action constituting a legal status 
defined by law. This status consists in bringing into operation certain 
duties and rights as between the belligerent states. The argument that the 
unlawful act of resorting to war can·not become the condition for the acqui-
sition of certain rights by the aggressor, rights determined by the law of 
war, is in principle mistaken. From the fact that the resort to war is, 
under certain circumstances, illegal, it follows only that the counter-war 
is, as a s-anction, legal. It does not of necessity follow that_ the duties and 
rights of belligerents are, as a matter of positive law, different in an unlaw-
ful war from what they have been in a lawful war. Nor is it actually the 
unlawful act per se that here becomes the source of right beneficial to the 
wrongdoer; it is rather a certain status as determined by law which forms 
the necessary condition for the exercise of certain duties and rights ex-
press! y provided for by the law .14 
Even if it is conceded that the principle ex injuria jus non oritur is not neces-
sarily applicable to the relationships between belligerents as determined by 
the traditional law of war, the conviction nevertheless persists that it is 
l3 In time, however, this situation may nevertheless give rise, through the operation of 
the rule of effectiveness, to a new legal situation beneficial to the aggressor. Indeed, so long as 
the international legal order retains its decentralized and relatively weak character this latter 
consequence must remain a strong possibility, despite the assumed operation of ex injuria j us 
non oritur. 
14 If the argument dealt with above were really well-founded it would, again in principle, 
be applicable consistently to any violation of international law. It is not difficult, however, to 
demonstrate that it is not so applicable. The case of reprisals furnishes a convenient example. 
It is generally agreed that the reprisals an injured state may take against a delinquent state are 
subject to certain restrictions. Presumably the most important of these restrictions is that 
reprisals "must be in proportion to the wrong done, and to the amount of compulsion necessary 
to get reparation." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 141. But what is this restriction if 
not an obligation of the state taking the reprisal? And to whom must the obligation refer? 
Obviously to the delinquent state who possesses the right to see that "disproportionate" 
reprisals are not taken against it, and to take measures of reprisal itself in the event this rule 
of proportionality is not observed. Yet if the argument dealt with above were correct the 
delinquent state could not acquire this "new power," that is a new legal right, by virtue of 
i ts illegal action. 
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somehow illogical or contradictory to continue to assume that the status 
and content of this law remains unchanged once the resort to war has been 
rendered, in principle, unlawful. However, there is no contradiction-at 
least no logical contradiction-involved in asserting the validity of a rule 
which prohibits in principle a certain act (the resort to war) and in asserting 
at the same time that should this act occur certain behavior (as determined 
by the rules regulating war's conduct) is to be mutually observed by the 
aggressor state as well as by those states resisting the aggression. The 
legal inequality between belligerents with respect to the war itself does not 
logically preclude their legal equality as concerns the applicability of the 
rules regulating the conduct of war.l5 
Nor does the argument appear convincing which rests upon the belief 
that the historic origin and justification of the traditional rules regulating 
belligerent relations presupposed the legal equality of the belligerents in 
relation to the war itself; and that in the absence of this legal equality as 
between belligerents there no longer remains any justification for assuming 
equality of rights and duties in the conduct of war. Whatever the historic 
origin and justification of the law of war, these considerations cannot of 
themselves affect the positive law. They suggest, at best, a disparity be-
tween the purposes which prompted the development of this law and the 
purpose behind the attempt to prohibit war in principle. It is supposed 
that the law of war had its primary justification in the traditional interpre-
tation of war as an" exercise of power." Assuming the effective prohibi-
tion of this'' exercise of power,'' and the consequent change in the interpre-
tation of war, the conclusion is drawn that the justification for retaining 
that law serving to regulate war's conduct has also ceased to exist. 
There is strong reason, though, for maintaining that the rules of warfare 
had both their origin and justification not so much in any indifference to 
the legal character of war but in the conviction that whatever the interpre-
tation given to war there must be rules for the regulation, and hence the 
mitigation, of war's conduct. It is not without significance that Grotius, 
though he was by no means alone in doing so, has given a classic expres-
15 In order to avoid a similar conclusion, while nevertheless seeking to retain at least a part 
of the law of war, a distinction has been made between war "in the legal sense" and war "in 
the material sense." For example, Quincy Wright, op. cit., p. 365. This distinction seems both 
unacceptable and unnecessary. It is unacceptable because it implies that the fact or situation 
"war" is no longer recognized in law, though a part of the law of war may nevertheless apply 
to this situation. But if the law of war is at all applicable to this situation it is because this 
situation has been given a specific legal existence. Thus from the point of view of law there 
can only be war "in the legal sense." It would seem that the real"reason for the distinctiQn 
between war "in the legal sense" and war "in the material sense" is the desire to differentiate 
between a war in which parties are legally equal as regards the war itself and a war in whi.ch 
there is not this legal equality. See, Harvard Research In International Law, Rights and Duties 
of States In Case of Aggression, op. cit., p. 82.3. 
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sian of this conviction. 16 Indeed, it must remain a source of some aston-
ishment that so many writers have insisted that it is hopeless to believe 
violence (war) can be regulated-admittedly a paradox of no small pro-
portion-and that the only solution is to do away with war itself. It 
is only a minor consideration that this opinion is not deterred by the 
fact that war has been regulated in the past, with varying degrees of 
effectiveness. More important is the dismissal of a relatively modest goal 
as being inherently unattainable and the ready acceptance of an ideal 
infinitely more difficult of realization. 17 
B. THE OPERATION OF THE LAW OF WAR 
DURING WORLD WAR II 
The contention that the changed legal position of war must of necessity 
affect the operation of the law of war finds little, if any, historical support 
in the attitude and behavior of the belligerents during the second World 
War. Although the Axis Powers were regarded as having resorted to war 
in violation of their international commitments-especially the obligations 
assumed under the Kellogg-Briand Pact-there was no disposition for that 
reason to claim that the law regulating the conduct of hostilities did not 
apply equally to all belligerents. Nor has the attitude manifested toward 
this question by war crimes tribunals contributed in any substantial measure 
to the view that a state waging an unlawful war cannot enjoy those rights 
relating to the conduct of war that have heretofore been conceded to all 
belligerents. In the vast majority of war crimes trials the question simply 
did not arise, and the assumption that even in an unlawful war the rules 
regulating the conduct of war are equally applicable to all belligerents 
appears to have been taken for granted. It was only exceptionally that 
tribunals w·ere called upon to declare otherwise legitimate acts of warfare 
unlawful for the reason that they had been performed on behalf of a state 
waging an illegal war. In these latter cases, the decisions of tribunals 
seem to indicate-on the whole-a refusal to deduce any consequences for 
16 In his masterful essay on "The Grotian Tradition In International Law," B. Y. I. L., 
2.3 (1946), Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, while placing emphasis upon the distinction Grotius makes 
between just and unjust wars, goes on to state: "At the same time, in conformity with the 
view which has remained unchallenged and which is in accordance with the humanitarian 
character of his treatise, he (Grotius) lays down that the question of the justice or injustice of 
the war is irrelevant for the purpose of observing the rules of warfare as between the bellig-
erents" (p. 39). 
17 See, for example, the excellent article by J. L. Kunz, "The Chaotic Status of the Laws of 
\Var and The Urgent Necessity for Their Revision," A.]. I. L., 45 (1951), pp. 37-61. 
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the operation of the law of war from the fact that the war itself was un-
lawful.18 
The same attitude characterized the judgment of courts, other than war 
crimes tribunals, in applying the rules regulating the economic aspects of 
warfare, i. e., the rules governing the lawful acquisition by belligerents of 
title over enemy property. In particular, the long-established right of bel-
ligerents to capture and condemn the public and private property of an 
enemy found at sea 'vas not questioned, so long as the captured enemy ves-
sels and goods were otherwise condemned in accordance with those rules 
governing the international law of prize. 19 
ts Thus the statement of the United States Military Tribunal in the Hostages Trial: '' ... we 
desire to point out that International Law makes no distinction between a lawful and an unlaw-
ful occupant in dealing with the respective duties of occupant and population in occupied ter-
ritory. There is no reciprocal connection between the manner of the military occupation of 
territory and the rights and duties of the occupant and population to each other after the rela-
tionship has in fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal is not an 
important factor in the consideration of this subject.'' (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others), Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals (cited throughout as Law Reports ... ) 8 (1949), p. 59· In 
The Justice Trial another tribunal declared: "It is persuasively urged that the fact that Ger-
many was waging a criminal war of aggression colours all of these acts with the dye of crimi-
nality. . . . If we should adopt the view that by reason of the fact that the war was a criminal 
war of aggression every act which would have been legal in a defensive war was illegal in this 
one, we would be forced to the conclusion that every soldier who marched under orders into 
occupied territory or who fought in the homeland was a criminal and a murderer. The rules 
of land warfare upon which the prosecution has relied would not be the measure of conduct 
and the pronouncement of guilt in any case would become a mere formality." (Trial of Josef 
Altstotter and Others), Law Reports ... , 6 (1948), p. 52..-Very rarely have courts seen fit to 
deduce certain consequences for the operation of the law of war simply from the fact that the 
war itself was unlawful. In one case, the Netherlands Special Court of Cassation declared 
that Germany, as an occupant, had no right of reprisal against the Dutch population for acts 
performed by the latter which would otherwise have been unlawful according to the law of 
belligerent occupation. The apparent reason given for this opinion was the "unlawful war 
of aggression" initiated by Germany against the Kingdom of the Netherlands. (Trial of Hans 
Alben Rauter), Law Reports ... , 14 (1949), pp. 133-8. 
19 "Neither judicial authority nor, to any substantial extent, the practice of Governments 
support the proposition that a State waging an unlawful war does not obtain or validly trans-
mit title with respect to property acquired in connexion with the conduct of war and in accord-
ance with international law." Lauterpacht, "The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, .. 
p. 2.39 (for a review of cases bearing upon the acquisition by the aggressor of property in the 
course of an illegal war, pp. 2.2.4-33). 
In this connection it may be noted that Annex XVII (A) of the Treaty of Peace between the 
Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, Paris, 10 February 1947, provided that: "Each of the 
Allied and Associated Powers reserves the right to examine, according to a procedure to be 
established by it, all decisions and orders of the Italian Prize Courts in cases involving owner-
ship rights of its nationals, and to recommend to the Italian Gover~ment that revision shall 
be undertaken of such of those decisions or orders as may not be in conformity with international 
law." Textin U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, IJJ46-47, p. 104. The "inter-
national law" referred to is the traditional law of prize. 
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C. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND 1 'HE OPERATION OF THE 
LAW OF W AR: T HE UNIT ED N ATIONS 20 
The preceding considerations have concentrated upon pointing out that 
there appears to be no valid reason for assuming that the changed legal po-
sition of war must necessarily result in the alteration of the rules regulating 
inter-belligerent relations. To the extent that the experience of the second 
World War is relevant in this connection it serves to support the conclusion 
that a state unlawfully resorting to war cannot, for that reason alone, be 
deprived of established belligerent rights. It may be contended, however, 
that these considerations, even if accepted, can have only a limited bearing 
upon the present situation; that they are relevant mainly as applied to the 
period prior to the establishment of the United Nations. Whereas the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact sought to 
place limitations upon the customary liberty of states to resort to war, both 
instruments recognized that war might nevertheless be resorted to by a state 
in violation of its obligations. Neither instrument provided for a pro-
cedure whereby the unlawful resort to war could be determined authorita-
tively, in a manner the signatory Parties were bound to accept. Although 
each state that was a Member of the League or a Party to the Paris Pact had 
the right to determine for itself when an unlawful resort to w ar had oc-
curred, such determination-or interpretation-had no binding effect upon 
other states. Nor did either instrument provide for the establishment of 
an international armed force apart from the armed forces of the various 
states. In particular, the illegal "resort to war" under Article 16 of the 
Covenant presupposed the creation of a state of war between the state vi-
olating its obligations and other Member states choosing to resort to a 
counter-war. Despite the contemplated coordination of effort on the part 
of those states waging a counter-war under Article 16 there seems to have 
been little doubt that the rules of war would apply to such action. 21 
In brief, although the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-
Briand Pact placed limitations upon the circumstances under which war 
could be resorted to lawfully it was clearly assumed that war continued to 
enjoy a legal existence. But even more important was the fact that neither 
instrument overcame the notmal conditions of decentralization that served 
20 It must be made clear that the following pages are concerned only with inquiring into 
the possible effect of recent developments in collective security upon the operation of the 
law of war. The reader must look to other sources should he desire a detailed and systematic 
analysis of these recent developments. Among a vast literature, of particular value for further 
reference are Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1951), and Julius Stone, op. cit., 
PP· 16s--2.93· 
21 Reports and Resolutions on the Suhject of Article 16 of the Covenant, Report by the Secretary-
General, League of Nations Doc. A. 14. 192.7 V., pp. 83-7. See also H. J. Taubenfeld, 
'' International Armed Forces and the Rules of War," A. J. I. L., 45 (1951) , pp. 671-2.. 
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in large measure to provide the justification for the traditional interpreta-
tion of war. This decentralization not only implied the absence of a pro-
cedure which would make possible an authoritative judgment that in a 
given instance a state had unlawfully resorted to war; it also rendered 
doubtful whether a counter-war could technically serve as an enforcement 
measure-as a sanction-in view of the unknown outcome of almost every 
war. 
The Charter of the United Nations, on the other hand, has been inter-
preted as effecting basic changes in the conditions that appeared to justify 
the traditional interpretation of war and that provided a favorable environ-
ment for the development of the law of war. Not only does the Charter 
refrain from the use of the term "war," speaking only of the illegal use of 
armed force (or of armed attacks) and of enforcement measures to be taken 
by the Organization, it also establishes a procedure whereby the unlawful 
resort to armed force can be determined in a manner binding upon the Mem-
ber states. 22 In addition, the Charter provides for the establishment of 
what may appropriately be termed an international armed force, as dis-
tinguished from the armed forces of the Member states. 23 It is the assump-
tion of the effective realization of these Charter provisions in practice that 
generally forms the basis of suggestions that the United Nations may select 
from the traditional law of war those rules considered desirable to govern 
the conduct of international armed forces and may determine the obligations 
22 This is, in principle, the result of Articles 2.4, 2.5 and 39 of the Charter. According to 
Article 2.4 the Members of the United Nations confer on the Security Council "primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and agree that in carrying out 
its duties the Security Council "acts on their behalf." In Article 2.5, the Members agree "to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter." Article 39 declares that the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42., to maintain or 
restore international peace and security." Article 41 refers to acts not involving the use of 
armed force, Article 42. to acts involving the use of armed force. 
23 The statement in the text presupposes, of course, the conclusion of the agreements provided 
for in Article 43, whereby the Members of the United Nations "undertake to make available 
to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, 
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security." Article 47 authorizes establishment of a 
Military Staff Committee, and stipulates that one of the Committee's principal functions is to 
advise and assist the Security Council on questions relating to the "employment and command 
of forces placed at its [i. e., the Security Council's] disposal." In their composition the armed 
forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council would still remain units of the armed 
forces of the various Member states. Nevertheless, they could appropriately be designated 
as "international" armed forces, and, in this respect distinguished from "national" armed 
forces, by virtue of the fact that they would be placed at the disposal of the Security Council 
and would operate under its strategic direction and command. See, for example, Kelsen, 
op. cit., pp. 762.-8. To date, no agreements of the nature referred to in Article 43 have been 
concluded. Nor is there any real prospect of their conclusion in the foreseeable future. 
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and rights of the delinquent state(s) against which enforcement action is 
taken. 24 
In view of the present realities of international organization the assump-
tion that the Security Council may make effective use of the powers granted 
it under Chapter VII of the Charter must clearly be regarded as improbable; 
so improbable, in fact, that the utility of a careful examination of the pos-
sible effect of this situation on the operation of the law of war appears dis-
tinctly limited. It may be observed, however, that_ it is by no means certain 
that even if this situation were realized the law of war would thereby cease 
to be equally applicable as between the international armed forces and the 
national armed forces against which action is taken. Whether or not these 
rules would cease to be applicable is a question that poses many difficult 
considerations. It is at least doubtful that these considerations can be 
resolved by inferential or deductive judgments which assert, in effect, that 
the law of the Charter may be interpreted to imply a change in the status 
and content of the law of war as one of its necessary effects. 25 In the ab-
sence of any reference-direct or indirect-to this matter in the Charter 
itself, the resulting uncertainty can be resolved only by a clear manifestation 
of the intention of the Member states of the United Nations. The most 
satisfactory methods for manifesting this intention would consist either in 
an amendment to the Charter or in a convention concluded by the General 
Assembly and ratified by all of the Member states. At the very least it 
would appear necessary that the intention to modify the rules of war in 
United Nations enforcement actions be established by a clear and effective 
practice to this effect. 
In particular,26 however, it is not sufficient to contend that in hostilities 
undertaken by national armed forces acting in response to a mere recommenda-
tion of the Security Council a change in the status and content of the rules 
of war must be assumed for the reason that the" United Nations acting on 
behalf of the organized community of nations against an offender, has a 
superior legal and moral position as compared with the other party to the 
24 For proposals to this effect, see Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948), pp. 
188-2.2.1. Also Taubenfeld, op. cit., pp. 672.-7. 
25 It is in this sense that Lauterpacht's remarks may be understood when, in referring to the 
possible effect of the Charter upon the law of war, he states: " . . . once a treaty has been 
adopted which is of fundamental and comprehensive character, it is difficult-and probably 
unscientific-to act on the view that it settles only that part of the law to which it expressly 
refers and nothing else. A treaty is not concluded in a legal vacuum. It is part of a legal system 
which, for that very reason, cannot contain rules which are contradictory. Any such contradic-
tion must be removed by a reasonable application of the principle that newly enacted law, if 
it is of a general and fundamental character, alters rules inconsistent therewith." op. cit., p. 2.09. 
26 The remarks made in the immediate paragraph of the text are largely relevant to the 
particular circumstances attending the outbreak of hostilities in Korea-circumstances dealt 
with in the following paragraphs-and must be read with this consideration in mind. 
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conflict.'' 27 As already noted, there is at present almost no possibility of 
the United Nations as such" acting on behalf" of the community of nations, 
implying thereby the existence of international armed forces at the disposal 
of the Organization, used to defend the legitimate interests of the Member 
states. On the contrary, the most reasonably optimistic situation-and 
the situation probably referred to in the above quoted statement-is that of 
national forces" acting on behalf of the United Nations,'' that is acting in 
conformity with a determination taken by a competent organ (at present 
only the Security Council) of the United Nations. 28 It is true that the 
legal position of states whose armed forces are acting on behalf of the 
United Nations-in the sense indicated above-is superior to the position 
of those parties unlawfully resorting to force. But this superiority does 
not of itself yield a right to modify the rules regulating war's conduct. 
Thus the hostilities undertaken in Korea by Member states of the United 
N a dons were preceded by a determination of the Security Council that the 
action of North Korea constituted a breach of the peace and a recommendation 
of the Council that members of the United Nations furnish assistance-
including armed forces-to repel this unlawful action and to restore inter-
national peace and security. 29 It is possible to consider those states re-
27 Report of Committee on Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations, "Should The 
Law of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?" Proceedings, American Society of 
International Law (1952.), p. 2.17. The report of the Committee, which has reference primarily 
to the Korean action, concludes that:" ... in the present circumstances ... the United Na-
tions should not feel bound by all the laws of war, but should select such of the laws of war 
as may seem to fit its purpose (e. g., prisoners of war, belligerent occupation), adding such 
others as may be needed, and rejecting those which seem incompatible with its purpose. We 
think it beyond doubt that the United Nations, representing practically all the nations of the 
earth, has the right to make such decisions.'' 
28 But a "determination" (e. g., that a "breach of the peace" has occurred) which does 
not-and in the Korean Case did not-impose upon Member states the obligation to take meas-
ures involving the use of armed force against the party unlawfully resorting to force. 
20 In its resolution of June 2.5, 1950 (U. N. Security Council, Official Records, jth year, No. IJ 
(Doc. S/zJOI) p. 18.), the Security Council, after determ'ining that the armed attack upon the 
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constituted a "breach of the peace," called for 
the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the "authorities of North Korea to withdraw 
forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel." In addition, the Council called 
upon all Members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this 
resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." In its 
resolution of June 2.7, 1950 (U.N. Doc. S/zJII) the Council merely recommended that: ... Members 
of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary 
to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security within the area." 
On July 7, 1950, the Security Council adopted a resolution (U. N. Doc. S/IJ88) in which it 
welcomed the "prompt and vigorous support" given its earlier resolutions, noted the offers 
of assistance for the Republic of Korea on the part of Members, recommended that "all Mem-
bers providing military forces and other assistance ... make such forces and other assistance 
available to a unified command under the United States," requested the United Sta.tes to desig-
nate the commander of such forces, authorized the use of the United Nations flag by the Unified 
Command, and requested the United States to provide the Council with periodic reports on 
the course of action taken under the Unified Command. 
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sponding to this recon1mendation as having acted ''on behalf'' of the 
United N ations. 30 There was no suggestion etnanating from authoritative 
sources, however, that the opposing parties to this conflict were not equally 
bound by the existing rules of w ar. Neither the refusal to designate these 
30 This possibility necessarily assumes that the: resolu tions of the Security Council in the 
Korean Case- and particularly the resolution of June 2.5- not only were permitted by the 
Charter but that they imposed certain obligations and conferred certain rights upon the Member 
states. It will be recalled thac the resolutions in question were· passed in the absence of the 
Soviet Union. The question therefore arose as to whether valid decisions on nonprocedural 
matters could be made in the absence of a permanent Member (and a Member who later chal~ 
lenges the validity of such decisions). The opinions of writers have been sharply divided on 
this question. An impressive negative reply has been given by Julius Stone, op. cit., pp. 2.o7-r2., 
and Leo Gross, ''Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from 
Meetings," Yale Law Journal, 6o (1951), pp. 2.09-57· For an affirmative reply see Myres S. 
McDougal and Richard N. Gardner, ''The Veto and The Charter: An Interpretation for Sur-
vival," Yale Law Journal, 6o (1951), pp. 2.58-92.. And for an argument holding both answers 
equally possible, see Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 2.9o-4, 94o-r. 
If the view is taken that an affirmative reply to the above question is possible-and it is the 
view adopted here-the problem remains of determining the duties imposed and the rights con-
ferred upon Member states. Although the resolution of June 2.5 called upon all Members to 
render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of that resolution it is extremely 
difficult-if not impossible-to contend that Member states were under any obligation to take 
active measures in support of South Korea, and particularly measures involving the use of 
armed force. This view is supported by the fact that the Security Council's two later resolu-
tions merely recommended that Member states furnish assistance-including armed forces-to 
the Republic of Korea. The Security Council expressly refrained from making any decision 
under Article 39 to order those enforcement measures provided for in Article 42.. It must be 
further observed that the obligation of Member states to take measures of armed force provided 
for in Article 42. is probably dependent upon the conclusion of the special agreements provided 
for in Article 43· In the absence of such agreements it is entirely doubtful that the Security 
Council is competent to obligate Member states to take military measures against a party con-
sidered by the Council to have committed a threat to or breach of the peace. For these reasons 
it does not appear possible to characterize the action in Korea as a "United Nations enforcement 
action"-at least not in the strict legal sense-since this would imply an enforcement action 
ordered by the Security Council under Articles 39 and 42.. Similar doubt must be expressed over 
the accuracy of references to "United Nations forces" in Korea. The Unified Command in 
Korea was not created by the Security Council in conformity with Article 2.9 of the Charter. 
Strictly speaking the Unified Command was not an "organ" of the United Nations and the 
forces serving under this command were not-again in a strict sense-"United Nations forces." 
See, in this respect, Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 936-40 and the excellent remarks of Richard R. Baxter, 
"Constitutional Forms and Some Legal Problems of International Military Command," 
B. Y.l. L., 2.9 (1952.), PP· 333-7. 
On the other hand, it can be maintained that Member states were at least under the obligation 
"to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." In addition, it seems 
clear that the effect of the Security Council's determination of a breach of the peace and of its 
later recommendations was to confer upon Members the right to take measures of armed force in 
support of the Republic of Korea. In so doing Member states acted ''on behalf'' of the United 
Nations, even though their action may not be strictly characterized as a "United Nations en-
forcement action." Of course, it may be contended that even in the absence of any Security 
Council action, under Article 51 (see p. 18) Member states could have claimed the right to 
assist in the collective defense of the Republic of Korea (though this requires interpreting Article 
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hostilities as " war" nor the questionable insistence upon considering the 
national contingents involved as "United Nations troops" 31 affected the 
application of the international law of war. On the contrary, there was 
on more than one occasion express affirmation that both the aggressor 
forces and the forces acting on behalf of the United Nations were equally 
obligated to conform in their actions to the law of war. It is quite true 
that in the Korean conflict the primary concern was to secure the observance 
of those rules governing the treatment by belligerents of prisoners of war. 
The rules governing the behavior of armed forces in actual combat received 
only minor consideration. But this does not detract from the conclusion 
that the Korean conflict saw no substantial alteration in the status and 
content of the rules regulating inter-belligerent relations. 
The circumstances attending the outbreak of hostilities in Korea must be 
regarded as exceptional, however. In view of the factors which render any , 
future decisions by the Security Council under Chapter VII extremely un-
likely,32 the most probable situation is that of armed conflict being waged 
under Article 51 of the Charter. 33 Each side must be expected to maintain 
that it is acting in self-defense-or collective defense-against an aggressor, 
\Vith no subsequent decision taken either by the Security Council or by any 
other organ endowed with the proper competence to revie\v-particularly 
vvhile hostilities last-the competing claims of the contending parties. 
This situation vvould then resemble, in its essential features, that of World 
War II, and there \vould seem little doubt that in such a conflict the rules 
51 as applying-despite its wording-to non-Member states as well). At the same time, it 
must be admitted that there is a substantial difference between the resort to armed force under 
Article 51, and without any authoritative determination of the party that has unlawfully re-
sorted to an armed attack, and the resort to armed force when taken in conformity with a valid 
determination to that effect by the Security Council (here again, the assumption being that 
such determination in the Korean Case was valid.). 
For a quite different point of view from that taken in the present note, see particularly the 
learned and stimulating analysis of the Korean affair advanced by Professor Stone, op. cit., 
PP · 2.2.8-3 7 • 
31 See note 30 above. 
32 I. e., the voting provisions of the Charter, requiring as rhey do the unanimity of the 
permanent Members on any decisions-or determinations--taken under Chapter VII. And while 
it may be argued that Article 2.7 does not forbid such decisions in the absence of a permanent 
Member, it is altogether improbable that a permanent Member will ever again .absent itself 
from the Council during a critical period. 
33 Article 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United · 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain internat.ional 
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the aQ.thor-
ity and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." 
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regulating the conduct of war would be fully applicable as between the 
belligerents. 34 
The above situation vvould not be substanti ally altered by the attempt, 
incident upon the outbreak of armed conflict, to obtain a·' collective deter-
mination" of the party unlawfully resorting to armed force by a decision 
reached under the General Assembly Resolution "Uniting For Peace." 85 
At present, such collective determinations the General Assembly may make 
under the Resolution" Uniting For Peace'' constitute only recommendations 
to the Members. Although expressive of the opinion of the ma jority of 
states making up the Organization, these recommendations do not create 
legal obligations for the Member states. 36 Nor, for that reason, may the 
nature of these recommendations be compared with the decisions the 
Security Council is competent to render under Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the 
Charter. It is also necessary to distinguish between the ''collective meas-
ures" that may be taken by the national armed forces of Member states 
acting in response to a recommendation of the General Assembly and 
34 Occasionally, the opinion has been expressed that the situation resulting from the inability 
of the Security Council to reach an authoritative determination (of the party unlawfully resort-
ing to the use of force) under Chapter VII of the Charter can be overcome by other, and equally 
binding, procedures. Thus Professor Quincy Wright states that : "While in some cases it may 
be difficult to obtain a decision as to the justifiability of a particular use of force because of the 
veto in the Security Council, customary international law provides a procedure, that of general 
recognition, applicable when conventional procedures fail to function." op. cit., p. 370. The 
same writer has suggested that a two-thirds vote of the states making up the General Assembly 
will suffice for such "general recognition." It is difficult to find a basis in existing law in 
support of this opinion. 
35 For text of Resolution, see U. N. General Arsembly, Official Records, ph Sess. Supp. No. 20 
(Doc. A/I77J), p. ro. The heart of this resolution is to be found in two operating paragraphs 
which read-in part-as follows: 
"The General Assembly, ... 
r. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view 
to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the 
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security .... 
8. Recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain 
within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could 
promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a 
United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual 
or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter." 
36 "There is no warrant in the Charter for considering the designation of the aggressor 
by virtue of a Resolution of the General Assembly, and the resulting illegality of war on his 
part, as legally binding upon States which have not voted for the Resolution." Lauterpacht, 
op. cit., p. 2.07. Indeed, there is no warrant for regarding the designation of an aggressor by 
virtue of a General Assembly Resolution as legally binding even upon states which have voted 
for the resolution. 
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measures of a collective character taken by national armed forces acting not 
merely in response to a recommendation of the Security Council but also in 
conformity with an authoritative determination of the aggressor by that 
same organ.37 Although a considerable degree of coordination may be 
achieved among the national armed forces of 1\1ember states acting in re-
sponse to General Assembly recommendations made under the "Uniting 
For Peace" Resolution, the present character of such recomtnendations does 
not appear to ?.llow the conclusion that these forces may be considered as 
acting "on behalf" of the United Nations. Indeed, there would seem to be 
no substantial reason for differentiating between the coordination of collec-
tive military measures made in response to General Assembly recommenda-
tions and the coordination of collective defense measures allowed to Mem-
ber states under Article 51 of the Charter, even though the moral authority 
with wbich the former would be endowed ought not to be neglected. In 
any event, it is significant to observe that the reports submitted to date by 
the Collective Measures Committee, established under the "Uniting For 
Peace" Resolution,38 contain no suggestion that the rules traditionally regu-
lating the conduct of hostilities between belligerents ought not to apply to 
hostilities undertaken in response to General Assembly recommendations. 
To the extent that the Collective Measures Committee has dealt with the 
question of the applicability of the law of war there is the assumption that 
these rules will continue to be applicable.39 
37 Once again, the evident basis for the statement made in the text is provided by the cirtum-
stances attending the outbreak of the Korean hostilities. See notes 2.9 and 30 above. 
38 Paragraph II of the "Uniting For Peace" Resolution establishes "a Collective Measures 
Committee consisting of fourteen Members" and directs the Committee "in consultation with 
the Secretary-General and with Member states as the Committee finds appropriate, to study 
and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than September 
I, I95I, on methods ... which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace 
and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of 
collective self-defense and regional arrangements .. .'' Since its establishment, the Collective 
Measures Committee has issued several reports. The first, and basic, report was completed in 
1951; see U. N. General Assemhly, Official Records, 6th Sess. Supp. No. IJ (Doc. A/z89z). 
39 Paragraph 2.46 of the first report of the Collective Measures Committee (U.N. Doc. A/1891, 
p. 2.9) states that: "In any future operations, the executive military authority designated by 
the United Nations should follow the humanitarian principles applied and recognized by 
civilized nations involved in armed conflict. In particular, the special position and functions 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross should be recognized, and its activities assisted, 
by the executive military authority.'' The "executive military authority" is to comprise a 
state or a group of states. Thus the Collective Measures Committee Report states that "upon 
the determination to adopt measures involving the use of United Nations armed force, the 
Organization should authorize a State or group of States to act on its behalf as executive mili-
tary authority, within the framework of its policies and objectives as expressed through s1,1ch 
resolutions as it may adopt at any stage of the collective action" (p. 2.5). At present, however, 
the executive military authority would not act "on behalf" of the Organization, but rather 
on behalf of the Member states of the Organization which decide to adopt collective military 
measures. Throughout the report the example of Korea is used as a guide and precedent a pre-
cedent which is apt to prove misleading. Although the forces acting in Korea could properly 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
It may be useful, at this point, to summarize the principal conclusions 
that appear to emerge from the preceding examination of the possible effects 
of the changed legal position of war on the operation of the law of war. In 
addition, brief attention will be directed to those situations involving the 
use of armed force between states, though situations not recognized by the 
parties involved as war, in which the law of war-or at least a part of this 
law-may nevertheless be considered as operative. 
(1) A clear distinction must be drawn between the legality of the act of 
resorting to war and the applicability of the rules regulating the conduct of 
war. The fact that the resort to war has been rendered, in principle, un-
lawful does not compel the conclusion that in a war illegally resorted to by 
one side the rules regulating inter-belligerent relations are either inappli-
cable or substantially modified in their operation.40 The rights conferred 
and the duties imposed upon belligerents in the conduct of war are not 
dependent for their operation upon an equality of legal status as concerns 
the war itself. Nor does it appear correct to assume that, given the changed 
legal posjtion of war, a continued equality of belligerent status vvith respect 
to the rules regulating war's conduct is contrary to the principle ex injuria 
jus non oritur. For this principle ought not to be interpreted to mean that 
no legal rights may accrue to the lawbreaker as a result of his unlawful act, 
particularly those legal rights that have been expressly provided by law 
for just that situation arising out of the unlavvful act. 
(2.) To the extent that the applicability of the law of war is to be re-
stricted in its operation by virtue of the changed legal position of war in 
international law such restriction can be brought about only through the 
customary practice of states or by convention. Neither the Covenant of the 
League of Nations nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact have been interpreted as so 
restricting the operation of the law of war. It also seems clear that neither 
be considered as acting "on behalf" of the United Nations, the same phrase when used to 
describe the action of forces responding to a General Assembly recommendation overlooks the 
decisive legal difference between hostilities whose character rests upon a determination rendered 
by the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter and hostilities whose character is deter-
mined by a recommendation of the General Assembly. Nor is it accurate to speak, as does the 
above report, of "measures involving the use of United Nations armed force," the obvious 
intention being to include in this term the national armed forces of Member states acting in 
response to General Assembly recommendations. For such forces bear to an even smaller degree 
the appellation of "United Nations armed forces" than did the armed forces serving in Korea-
forces whose status has already been commented upon.-Gnce again, the general observation 
should be made that the decisions taken and the collective measures applied by virtue of the 
"Uniting for Peace" resolution do not substantially differ at present from decisions and measures 
of collective defense taken under Article 51. The altogether commendable desire to strengthen 
the present system of collective security should not serve to obscure this basic consideration. 
40 Law of Naval Wa1jare (see Appendix), Section 2.oo. 
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the attitude of the belligerents during World War II nor the decisions ren-
dered by courts in applying the law of war provide any solid basis for the 
opinion that the changed legal status of war has affected the applicability 
of the law of war. 
(3) In general, it is difficult to establish any significant restriction on 
the operation of the rules regulating inter-belligerent relations consequent 
upon the avoidance of the term "war" in the Charter of the United Nations. 
(On the contrary, it is more than likely, as will be noted, that the Charter 
will have the contrary effect, i.e., of expanding the situations in which the 
law of war is applicable.) By forbidding to member states the use of armed 
force in their mutual relations, save as a measure taken in conformity with 
a decision of the Security Council or as a measure of individual or collective 
defense against an armed attack, the Charter seeks to regulate every use of 
armed force and not only the use of armed force which assumes the character 
of war. It has already been noted that the refusal on the part of certain 
states to designate the hostilities in Korea as "war" did not, for that 
reason, have any appreciable effect upon the operation of the international 41 
law of war as this law applies to the mutual relations of belligerents. The 
same absence of effect upon the operation of the law of war will probably 
hold for future occasions, similar to Korea, in which states wish to avoid 
the use of the term war, mainly in order to give hostilities what is consid-
ered to be a higher dignity and purpose (i. e., by terming such hostilities 
"international police actions," "measures of collective defense") than war 
had according to the traditional doctrine. But it would seem a mistake to 
attach too great significance to verbal devices, particularly at the expense 
of legal reality. Insofar as the law of war is applied as between the parties 
to an armed conflict the legal relevance-or, rather, the lack of legal rele-
vance-in refusing to term such a conflict war should be clearly u..nderstood. 
(4) The assertion that the rules of warfare would not apply to inter-
national armed forces engaged in a United Nations enforcement action, must 
be very seriously questioned. Neither the principle ex injuria jus non oritur 
nor the admittedly superior legal position of the forces undertaking United 
Nations enforcement actions proyide sufficient basis for contending against 
the continued applicability of the rules regulating inter-belligerent relations. 
Besides, given the present state of international organization these questions 
can possess no more than a remote hypothetical significance. At the very 
41 On the other hand, this refusal to designate the contest in Korea as war has had certain 
effects in relation to the decisions of municipal courts and the operation of municipal legislation 
intended for periods of war. It is, of course, always necessary to distinguish between the 
operation of municipal legislation, dependent upon a status or condition of war as defined by 
municipal law, and the operation of the international law of war. For some effects of this 
distinction in the case of Korea, see Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 22-I-3. In the United States_the 
highest military court, the United States Court of Military Appeals, considered the Korean 
conflict as war for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. 
22 
least, they must assume not only an authoritative determination by the 
Security Council of the party unlawfully resorting to armed force, but also 
the actual direction by this organ of the armed forces of Member states under-
taking enforcement measures against the aggressor. National armed forces 
acting under the direction of the Security Council do so in response to a Coun-
cil decision imposing a legal obligation upon the Member states. The ex-
ceptional conditions accompanying the outbreak of hostilities in Korea 
may be interpreted as having permitted the fulfillment of the first of these 
conditions, though not the second. And Korea is not likely to be repeated . 
The strong probability, then, is that in a future resort to armed conflict 
there will be no authoritative determination of the aggressor. Although 
it is not at all unlikely that in the event of hostilities some kind of collective 
detelmination will be made of the party considered to have unlawfully re-
sorted to armed force, -possibly under Article 5 r of the Charter or according 
tc the" Uniting For Peace" Resolution, such determination cannot be con-
sidered at present as binding-in any legally relevant sense-upon those 
states dissenting from it. Under these circumstances there is still less reason 
for asserting any restrictions upon the operation of the rules regulating 
war's conduct. 
(5) Recent practice would appear to indicate that, if anything, the situa-
tions in which the law of war is considered applicable have expanded rather 
than contracted. 42 There is, in fact, a discernible tendency today to attempt 
to apply at least a substantial part of the rules governing the weapons and 
methods of war, and particularly the rules regulating the treatment of vic-
tims of war, to situations in which the parties engaged in armed conflict 
refrain from making a declaration of war and, at the same time, deny a~y 
intent of waging war. The evident purpose of this growing effort may be 
rightly described as the humanitarian one of extending as widely as possible 
the beneficial effects resulting from the application of the law of war. 
Thus Article 2. common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the 
Protection of the Victims of War, provides that the provisions of these 
Conventions are to be regarded as applicable" to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the 
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one 
of them.,·, The apparent intent of those drafting this article was to make 
the Geneva Conventions applicable to all international armed conflicts, 
without regard to whether or not such conflicts are recognized as war by 
the parties involved, though the wording of the article is not altogether 
42 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section no and notes thereto. In a sense, the tendency to apply 
the rules of war-or, at least, a substantial part of these rules-to armed conflicts regardless 
of whether these conflicts are considered by the parties involved as war finds a certain parallel 
in the attempt made in the Charter of the United Nations to regulate the resort to armed force 
generally and not merely the resort to war. 
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adequate 1n meeting this purpose.43 It is also apparent that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions are fully applicable either in the case of an illegal resort 
to \Var or an illegal resort to armed force; no differentiation is made in this 
respect, or even suggested, as between the rights and duties of the con-
tracting parties. 
At the same time, it is difficult to determine the precise extent to which 
other rules regulating the conduct of war apply to situations in which 
states-engaged in armed conflict-neither make a declaration of war 44 
nor admit the intent of waging war. Although it has been claimed that 
even in the absence of a formal state of war the rules regulating the mutual 
relations of belligerents are applicable to states immediately involved in 
43 See J. L. Kunz ("The Geneva Conventions of August 12., 1949," Law and Politics in The 
World Community, pp. 304-6), who asserts that since a state of wa_r may not be recognized by 
any party to a conflict "such a conflict would, under the letter of Article 2., not be included." 
This, for the reason that Article 1. speaks only of armed conflicts not recognized as war by one 
party to the conflict. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that Article 2., paragraph 
n of the "Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind," prepared by the 
United Nations International Law Commission at the request of the Genera(Assembly, refers 
to "'acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." In the explanatory comment following 
this paragraph it is stated that the latter "applies to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more States, even, if the existence of a state of 
war is recognized by none of them." U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, 6th Sess., Supp. 
No. 9 (Doc. A/I8J8), p. 13. In the essay quoted above Professor Kunz also criticizes Article 
1. of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for failing to provide clearly for "large scale fighting in 
the course of an international military enforcement action, as now going on in Korea. For 
this is not an armed international conflict 'between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties'.' • But this interpretation assumes that the armed forces in Korea were United Nations 
armed forces in the strict sense, and not the national forces of member states acting on behalf 
of the Organization. If the latter assumption is made, and it is submitted to be the more feasible 
one, then this particular difficulty does not arise. 
44 Hague Convention III (1907) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities obligates the contract-
ing parties not to commence hostilities ''without previous and explicit warning, in the form 
either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.'' 
It is doubtful whether customary international law required a state to give "previous and 
explicit warning" before commencing hostilities. Be Lhat as it may, the commencement of 
hostilities without previous warning or declaration nevertheless results in a state of war if 
this is the intention of the state commencing hostilities. Thus: ". . . States which deliber-
ately order the commencement ot hostilities without a previous declaration of war or a qualified 
ultimatum commit an international delinquency; but they are nevertheless engaged in war." 
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 2.99. The more difficult questions arise, however, as 
Professor Stone correctly points out, "where war is not openly intended by one or other parties, 
who insist rather on conducting their hostilities under some other name." op. ctt.; p. 3 12.. 
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armed conflict, the practice of states in this respect is still characterized by 
a substantialtneasure of uncertainty. 45 
45 See generally on this problem, Fritz Grob, The Relativity of War and Peace (1949). With 
respect to Hague Conventions II (r899) and IV (1907) regulating the conduct of war on land 
Grob declares: "\Vhether or not military operations are accompanied by naval operations, 
whether they are geographically limited or not, whether they are conducted by large units 
or merely by minute detachments, whether they extend over a period of years or last a few 
minutes only, all this cannot possibly make any difference for the application of the above 
rules of law on war." (p. 2.17 ). Though this statement is probably correct it is doubtful 
whether the application of these conventions on land warfare to all international armed con-
flicts can be deduced-as the author contends-from the intent and purpose of those drafting 
the conventions. However, it is true that despite the fact that these conventions refer to "war," 
the recent practice of states has been to apply them to all international armed conflicts, and it 
is this practice rather than the strict wording of the conventions in question that may be re-
garded as decisive in determining their present application to armed conflicts (''military opera-
tions") generally. On the other hand, P. Guggenheim (Traite de Droit International Public 
(1954), Vol. II, p. 312.) observes that while_ those rules having a military and humanitarian 
character are made increasingly applicable to all international armed conflicts, rules regulating 
the economic domain of war remain limited in their operation to war in the formal sense. 
Thus in hostilities at sea it is doubtful that the right to seize and, under appropriate circum-
stances, to destroy enemy private property may be extended at present to situations other 
than thos~ characterized as war in the formal sense. (See pp. ro2.-3.) Indeed, instances of 
"undeclared hostilities" have been confined, by and large, to operations on land, and for this 
reason alone it is difficult to estimate the degree to which the rules regulating the mutual 
behavior of belligerents may be considered applicable to naval hostilities where the parties 
involved deny any intent to wage war. No doubt one reason for confining "undeclared hos-
tilities" to operations on land is the desire to avoid raising problems concerning the position 
of third states or the nationals of third states. In naval hostilities it is seldom possible to 
avoid such problems.-Finally, distinguish clearly between the operation of the rules governing 
the mutual behavior of the combatants and the rules governing the mutual behavior of com-
batants and non-participating states. The latter rules-the law of neutrality-are clearly 
dependent for their operation upon recognition of a state of war, though such recognition 
may be effected either by the combatants or by third states acting independently of the parties 
directly involved in hostilities (see pp. 199-2.01). 
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